

Priority Handling**Congressional
Action****SUBJECT:**

SSCI: Senator Hatch's Request for Information on Soviet Approaches to U.S. Citizens

FROM:C/EPS, ☐**EXTENSION****DATE SENT**

26/2/88

REQUEST NUMBER**TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)****DATE****RECEIVED****FORWARDED****OFFICER'S
INITIALS****COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)**

1.

CI/EXO

26 Feb 88

2.

DC/CI

26 FEB 1988

3.

C/CI

4a CI/EXO

4b C/EPS ☐

16-3-88

5.

C/EPS

16 March

6.

SA/DDO

16/3

7.

ADDO

8.

DDO

17/3/88

9.

OCA/S

3/17 3/17

10. OCA/Reg.

3/17 3/17

11.

SUSPENSE DATE:

ASAP

12.

RETURN TO:FORM 4283
10-84**Priority Handling****Congressional
Action**

UNCLASSIFIED

14 March 1988

SUBJECT : Soviet Efforts to Recruit American Citizens

1. American citizens are high priority targets for recruitment by the Soviet Union's intelligence services. The Soviets are especially interested in Americans who occupy important positions in the fields of government, military service, business and finance, science and technology, industry, and academic research. The American "target" is, in fact, deemed so important that the senior Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, in the mid-1970s organized a special task force just to plan recruitment operations against selected American citizens. Referred to as "Group North," the task force operates across bureaucratic and geographical lines to plan and coordinate worldwide recruitment operations against American targets of interest. (see John Barron, The KGB Today)

2. As the following examples show, American citizens travelling or working in the USSR are most susceptible to KGB recruitment efforts, but the Soviets will target Americans anywhere in the world if they have an operational interest in a person and if they can gain access to that person.

--An American businessman who lives and works in Latin American was the object a recruitment attempt by a Soviet "correspondent" he had met at a dinner party. The Soviet was familiar with the American's business activities and his contacts at the local U.S. Embassy, and he attempted to draw the American into a "private" relationship in which the latter would receive financial compensation in exchange for information on the local American community. The Soviet's reference to the businessman's alleged financial problems suggested that he knew about or was probing for information that might make the American willing to provide information.

--A Soviet who claimed to work for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade contacted an American businessman and former U.S. government employee while the latter was on a business trip to the Soviet Union. The American was asked to provide information on U.S. government counterintelligence activities against the Soviet Union in the United States, and he also was threatened with unspecified retaliation if he refused. On his next trip to Moscow, the

UNCLASSIFIED

businessman was asked by the Soviet manager of his company's office to supply annual reports on defense and intelligence matters compiled by U.S. research institutes. The subject matter of the reports requested had nothing to do with the company's business interests in the USSR.

--The Soviets attempted, unsuccessfully, to mount a provocation against an American businessman who had been visiting the USSR for some ten years. During one of his business trips, the American citizen, whose company specialized in a technical field, first rebuffed a homosexual advance by a Soviet contact and then turned down an offer from another Soviet to provide him with prostitutes. Before giving up, the Soviets tried to convince the American to sign an agreement to supply them with proscribed technology.

--A naturalized American citizen and international banker returned to his native country in Eastern Europe for a visit. Several days after his arrival, he was approached by two men who identified themselves as officers from the KGB's "economics department" and offered to pay him for supplying economic and financial data. The Soviets had studied their target carefully, as indicated by the fact that they knew not only about his visit to his former homeland, but also about his background, residence, place of work, and telephone number in the United States. The two Soviets eventually supplied the banker with instructions on how maintain clandestine contact with the KGB in the United States.

--A Soviet used a "wrong telephone number" ploy to contact an American professor who was spending a sabbatical year in an East European country. The telephone contact turned into a face-to-face meeting during which the Soviet proposed an exchange of research papers and future editorial cooperation between himself and the American. During the conversation with the Soviet, the American mentioned that he would be attending an scientific conference the next year in another East European country. Shortly thereafter, the American met a woman in his hotel lobby who said she was from the country where the scientific conference would held. The woman invited the American professor to dinner. Later the American received a postcard from the woman, who said that she was looking forward to meeting the American again next year during the conference.

--The circumstances surrounding an intelligence approach to a U.S. serviceman suggest that the Soviet intelligence services are always on the outlook for vulnerable Americans willing to exchange sensitive information for money. Shortly after arriving in a West European country on an official assignment, the serviceman decided to do some shopping

UNCLASSIFIED

in a store near his hotel. A "salesman" who claimed to be a citizen of the country where the serviceman was visiting approached the American and engaged him in small talk. After only a few minutes of conversation, the alleged salesman bluntly asked the serviceman if he "had any secrets to sell," adding that the Soviet Union was willing to pay well for official information. The serviceman rejected the approach and left the store. Taken together, the store's location in a area that is frequented by visiting American servicemen and the almost casual approach to an American who had just barely arrived in the country suggest that the Soviets routinely target and attempt to suborn American personnel on temporary duty in the country in question.